




























































































































                                      The Bonn Graduate School of  Economics is
                                                             sponsored by theLOCAL INTERACTIONS AS A DECENTRALIZED MECHANISM
COORDINATING EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTATIONS
M. HOHNISCH
Abstract. In the context of standard two-period pure-exchange economies with sequen-
tial trade, this paper proposes a decentralized coordination mechanism for equilibrium-
expectations, facilitated by local interactions between agents. Interactions are modelled
stochastically by specifying a family of individual Markov processes on a two-dimensional
integer lattice Z2 in continuous time. These processes are interdependent, in that the tran-
sition rate of each agent’s expectation also depends on expectations of neighboring agents.
The particular speciﬁcation of transition rates chosen in the present paper is known as
the (two-dimensional) Voter Model. The composite process has two extremal invariant
measures and a continuum of non-extremal invariant measures. The economic content of
the stochastic expectations process is twofold. First, the convergence of the expectations
process itself constitutes a “sunspot-device”. While convergence to either one of the ex-
tremal invariant measures corresponds to a sunspot-free coordination state, convergence
to a convex mixture of invariant measures engenders a sunspot equilibrium. Thus, non-
ergodicity of the expectations process is related to the occurrence of sunspot equilibria.
Second, it explains how coordination of expectations is actually achieved through direct
interactions between agents. Any particular coordination state (deﬁned as a limiting mea-
sure of the process) can be traced back to a set of initial conﬁgurations or more general
initial distributions of expectations.
JEL classiﬁcation: D50, D51, D52, D80, D84
Keywords: Sunspot Equilibria, Voter model, local interactions, coordination
Date: June 15, 2005.
I am indebted to J.-M. Grandmont, who suggested incorporating interacting random processes in models
with sunspot-equilibria and provided crucial critical comments on an earlier version of the paper. I am
grateful to A. Klenke and T. Liggett for comments on some of their mathematical results used in this
paper. The synthesis of the present model, with its possible technical and conceptual shortcomings, is
mine. Financial support from DFG grant TR120/12-1 is gratefully acknowledged.
Address: Research Group Hildenbrand, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Lenn´ estr. 37,




It is well-known that in two-period pure-exchange economies sunspot equilibria can arise
if agents come to expect that the equilibrium obtaining in the second period depends on the
occurrence of some event which is otherwise irrelevant to the economy and if the occurrence
of this event is not insurable. (See Cass and Shell (1983) for the seminal paper on sunspot
equilibria and Cass (1989) for the particular model underlying the present paper.) Yet
issues such as the nature and the origin of sunspot events and the modelling of mechanisms
by which agents coordinate expectations on a sunspot event have received relatively little
attention so far, adding to the open problem of equilibrium selection and expectation
coordination in GET (see e.g. Allen et al. (2002)).
In this context, the present paper suggests a decentralized mechanism coordinating equi-
librium expectations, modelled as a continuous-time random process facilitated by local
interactions between agents. The process consists of a family of individual processes, in-
dexed by the two-dimensional integer lattice Z2. The index set Z2 corresponds to the set
of agents in the economy. Each individual process has a common state space consisting
of two distinct equilibrium expectations. The processes are locally interdependent in that
the transition rate of the individual expectation held by an agent also depends on the
conﬁguration of individual expectations of his nearest neighbors (with respect to Z2). The
particular speciﬁcation of transition rates is known as the (two-dimensional) Voter Model.
The basic properties of the above process are the following. It is non-ergodic with
two extremal invariant measures. It can converge to either one of its extremal invariant
measures, in which mass is concentrated on a “full-consensus” conﬁguration (a conﬁguration
in which all agents hold the same expectation), or to one element of the continuum-set of
non-extremal invariant measures (being convex mixtures of invariant measures), each of
which has both full-consensus conﬁgurations as its support.
The economic content of the stochastic expectations process is twofold. First, the conver-
gence of the expectations process itself constitutes a “sunspot-device”. While convergence
to either one of the extremal invariant measures corresponds to a sunspot-free coordination
state, convergence to a convex mixture of invariant measures engenders a sunspot equi-
librium (in both cases with an underlying economy as the one analysed by Cass (1989),
for concreteness). Thus, non-ergodicity of the expectations process is related to the oc-
currence of sunspot equilibria. Second, it explains how coordination of expectations is
actually achieved through direct interactions between agents. Any particular coordination
state (deﬁned as a limiting measure of the process) can be traced back to a set of initial
conﬁgurations or more general initial distributions of expectations.LOCAL INTERACTIONS AS A DECENTRALIZED MECHANISM ... 3
The principle behavioral assumption in the proposed coordination-mechanism is that an
agent who must form an expectation about the occurrence of a future event but lacks rele-
vant information to do so tends to align himself with the expectations held by other agents
in his “reference group”. The reader is referred to empirical results in social psychology
which provide evidence that there is a tendency to socially-driven alignment of opinion in
humans. Pioneering results in that ﬁeld of research are those of Asch (1951, 1956) and
Festinger (1954). The present paper does not attempt to provide an explanatory model for
such reference-group inﬂuence in expectation formation. (An explanatory model for social
eﬀects in consumption was provided by Bernheim (1994).)
Also, it should be stressed that a stochastic modelling of expectations does not imply that
expectations are necessarily to be thought of as random in a behavioral sense. One might
well propose deterministic interactive behavioral mechanisms on the micro-level, possibly
more explanatory in character. However, when applied in modelling large systems, such
deterministic models would most likely produce a degree of complexity which is solvable
neither analytically nor numerically for long-enough periods of time. Therefore, the sto-
chastic modelling approach to large economies should be considered as a statistical one1
- a descriptive shortcut providing the possibility of analyzing analytically the aggregate
behavior of a large economy with direct interactions between agents.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic speciﬁcations
and properties of the proposed stochastic process of expectations based on well-known
mathematical results concerning the Voter Model. Section 3 provides two examples of how
the process can be incorporated into concrete GET-models. In Section 3.1, we present the
main example, in which “endogenous-sunspot equilibria” are introduced based on Cass’s
(1989) leading example of sunspot-equilibria in a two-period economy with nominal assets.
In Section 3.2, an example of equilibrium-selection facilitated by expectation-coordination
in decoupled spot-economies (“trivial sunspot-equilibria” in the terminology of Mas-Colell
(1992)) is brieﬂy outlined. Finally, Section 4 contains a few additional comments on the
results presented.
2. A stochastic model of interactions-driven dynamics of expectations
This section introduces a family of locally interacting stochastic processes, representing in
the present paper the time-evolution of individual equilibrium expectations. Such a family
can be viewed as a single process on an appropriate state space. Assume that at any given
1Such a modelling approach corresponds to a concept called Statistical Economics. The terminus has been
suggested by J.M. Grandmont (1992) alluding to Statistical Physics. Seminal work in this direction was
done by Hildenbrand (1971) and F¨ ollmer (1974).4 M. HOHNISCH
time t ∈ R+, an agent can expect one of two2 equilibria to obtain in the following trading
period. These individual expectation states are denoted by e1 and e2 and the individual
state space of the process by S = {e1,e2}.3 The countably inﬁnite set of agents is denoted
by A, and by X := SA the set of expectation conﬁgurations of agents in A. (The space
X is compact in the product topology.) Let ηa,t ∈ S denote the expectation of agent a at
time t ∈ R+ and ηt ∈ X a conﬁguration of expectations at time t.
To specify a topology of local interactions, the set of agents A will be endowed with
a time-invariant graph structure (implying that each agent a always interacts with the
same subset N(a) ⊂ A of other agents). In the present paper we identify A with the two-
dimensional integer lattice Z2 and set N(a) = {b ∈ Z2 : |b − a| = 1} with | · | denoting the
Euclidean distance in R2.
The particular speciﬁcation of transition rates chosen in this paper is known as the Voter
Model.4 The evolution mechanism is given by the assumption that ηa,t ∈ S changes to the







The transition rate of an agent’s equilibrium expectation is thus proportional to the number
of neighboring agents holding a diﬀerent equilibrium expectation. Clearly, if the expecta-
tions of agents were independent, the individual transition rate c(a,·) would depend only
on ηa,t; in the case speciﬁed by the above rate, expectations are interdependent, but direct
interaction is restricted to next-neighbors.
It is to be shown that there exists a process with path-space distribution P η0 (with the
superscript indicating that the process starts at the initial conﬁguration η0 in time 0) such
that for each a ∈ A and each initial conﬁguration η0
(2) P
η0[ηa,t 6= ηa,0] = c(a,η0)t + o(t)
for t → 0. Moreover, in continuous time it is natural to require that the process P η0 is such
that at most one coordinate changes in a point in time, i.e. for each a,b ∈ A and each η0
(3) P
η0[ηa,t 6= ηa,0,ηb,t 6= ηb,0] = o(t)
2The assumption that there are exactly two possible expectations will enable us to directly refer to the
existence results of Cass (1989); see Section 3.1.
3The equilibrium expectations constituting the set S might be time-dependent, because individuals only
gradually learn to what invariant measure - implying a coordination state - the process converges, and thus
which equilibria emerge in the economy; see ﬁnal paragraph in Sect. 3.1 for an elaboration of this point.
4The Voter Model was introduced independently by Cliﬀord and Sudburry (1973) and Holley and Liggett
(1975). For an extensive discussion, see Chapter V of Liggett (1986) and Part II of Liggett (1999).LOCAL INTERACTIONS AS A DECENTRALIZED MECHANISM ... 5
for t → 0. The existence and uniqueness of such a process has been shown, among others,
by means of the Markov semigroup approach and the Hille-Yosida theorem. The reader is
referred to Liggett (1985) for thorough treatment of these issues (see also the Appendix to
this paper for a brief outline).
Let P(X) denote the set of all probability measures on the set X of expectation-
conﬁgurations, equipped with the topology of weak convergence, i.e.




fdµ ∀f ∈ C(X)
with C(X) denoting the space of continuous functions on X. Suppose µ ∈ P(X) as an
initial distribution of the process. The probability measure of the process at time t, denoted




S(t)fdµ ∀f ∈ C(X).
An important set of measures are those which are invariant under shift in time.
Deﬁnition 1. A measure µ ∈ P(X) is called invariant for the Markov semigroup (St)t∈R+
if µSt = µ for all t ≥ 0. The set of all invariant measures will be denoted by I.
Invariant measures represent equilibrium-states for the underlying stochastic process.
The next proposition conﬁrms that only these measures can obtain as limiting distributions
of the process (see Liggett, 1985, p.10).
Proposition 1. If ν = limt→∞ µSt exists for some initial measure µ ∈ P(X), then ν ∈ I.
The situation is simple if the process converges to a single limit distribution from any
initial measure (implying that I is a singleton), a situation which corresponds to what is
called probabilistic ergodicity of a process. However, multiplicity of invariant measures is at
the core of the present paper, since it aims at modelling a situation with multiple possible
economic coordination-states.
For the Voter Model, non-ergodicity is obvious. Because transition rate is zero for an
agent in agreement with all his next-neighbors, the Voter Model has as invariant measures
at least the point-mass measures concentrated on the full-consensus conﬁgurations ηei with
(ηei)a = ei ∀a, with i = 1,2. These measures, which are extremal, will be denoted by
δei. Every convex combination δα = αδe1 + (1 − α)δe2 with α ∈ (0,1) is also invariant,
though non-extremal. For the latter measures, the empirical distribution is random, with
probability α for occurrence of a full-consensus on e1, and 1 − α for e2.
The question of whether there is stable coexistence of opinions, i.e. whether there exist
extremal invariant measures other than δe1 and δe2, is of both mathematical and, as will6 M. HOHNISCH
become clear in Section 3, of economic interest. For the present model, the answer is
negative5 (see Liggett (1985, Sect. V 1)).
Having characterized the set of invariant measures, the next issue relevant for the eco-
nomic models of Section 3 is convergence to these measures. Theorem 1.9 with Corollary
1.13 from Liggett (1985, p.231) provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for convergence
for a wide class of initial measures. An example is the following
Proposition 2. Let µ ∈ P(X) denote a translation-invariant measure with marginals
µ{η : η(a) = e1} = α. Then
lim
n→∞µS(t) = αδe1 + (1 − α)δe2.
Remark 1. There are initial conditions for which convergence does not occur.
A question crucial for a rational-expectations economic model is whether an agent can
infer the weights α and 1−α of the extremal components in the limiting distribution from
observing the realizations of expectations in a ﬁnite subset of agents. (As will be explained
below, these weights are equal to the probabilities of what will be deﬁned as sunspot events
in the present model.)
The following property, called clustering, holds for the two-dimensional Voter Model (see
Liggett (1999), Th. 1.3, p.141)
(4) lim
t→∞P
η0(ηt(a) 6= ηt(b)) = 0
for all a,b ∈ Z2 and all initial conditions η0. Thus, for any arbitrary large ﬁnite volume, after
a long enough period of time one observes (almost) all agents having assumed expectations
of the same type.
With Eq. 4 in mind, there arise two scenarios for the convergence of the two-dimensional
Voter Model to a non-extremal measure. First, in any large but ﬁnite volume the process
settles randomly on one “extremal invariant measure”6 after some random time T (with
probabilities α and 1 − α respectively), not returning to the other one thereafter. Second,
the process oscillates between the two invariant measures inﬁnitely often, with no such T
existing. Cox and Griﬀeath (1986) and, in a more general setting, Cox and Klenke (2000)
have shown that the second scenario actually obtains.
Moreover, the weights α and 1 − α determine the proportion of time spent “close” to
either one of the extremal measures (again, restricted to a large ﬁnite volume). Because
5The answer is positive for lattice-dimension greater than or equal three (for details, see Liggett (1985,
Sect. V 1)).
6More precisely, what is meant is the convergence in a ﬁnite volume to the projection of an inﬁnite-volume
invariant measure to that ﬁnite-volume.LOCAL INTERACTIONS AS A DECENTRALIZED MECHANISM ... 7
of these properties, agents can infer the weights of the extremal components by sampling
expectations in a ﬁnite subset of agents over a long enough period of time.
3. Application to Sunspot-Phenomena and Equilibrium-Coordination
The present section places the model of decentralized coordination of equilibrium expec-
tations, the mathematical properties of which were outlined in the previous section, in the
context of two simple economies, each a two-period (t = 0,1) pure-exchange economy. In
Section 3.1, the underlying market structure corresponds to the leading example of the ex-
istence of sunspot-equilibria in a ﬁnite-horizon economy with unrestricted participation but
incomplete asset-structure presented by Cass (1989). In this context, the model introduced
in the present paper both explains how coordination of expectations comes about, and
makes the actual sunspot-mechanism underlying the coordination endogenous. In Section
3.2, the underlying market structure is a pair of decoupled spot-economies (with no ﬁnan-
cial assets to transfer wealth) with multiple equilibria in the second period. In that context,
the model can explain coordination of expectations between the a-priori given equilibria
(but the coordination process has no inﬂuence on the economy, unless one assumes a causal
link from the expectations of agents to the equilibrium actually obtaining).
Throughout Section 3, the coordination process is assumed to evolve, and its limiting
distribution to emerge, prior to trading decisions being made in period t = 0. The limit-
ing distribution of the process corresponds to a coordination-state (see Section 3.1). The
realization of a conﬁguration of expectations from the limiting distribution of the coordina-
tion process - called the coordination-outcome and corresponding to the sunspot-event - is
assumed to become known between t = 0 and t = 1. In the present model the coordination-
outcome can be either one of the full-consensus conﬁgurations ηe1 and ηe2.
It is important to remark that the time scales of the market exchange process in discrete
time (the two-period context can be arbitrarily extended) and the expectation-coordination
process in continuous time, are not comparable. It is up to the modeller to specify a relation
between them. Therefore, the convergence of the process (the limit t → ∞) need not take
“longer” in real time than the time interval between two consecutive trading periods.
3.1. An example of an endogenous-sunspot equilibrium. Following Cass (1989),
assume a two-period (t = 0,1) pure-exchange economy with a single good available in each
period, denoted by yt, traded on a spot market in period t. In period 0, there is also
a ﬁnancial instrument (bond), denoted by b, with exogenous nominal returns r1 and r2,
possibly depending on an “endogenous sunspot-event”. The price of the good in period t
is denoted by pt, with the price of the bond being normalized to unity in each period. The8 M. HOHNISCH
spot-price of the good in the second period may also depend on the “endogenous sunspot-
event”. The price vector is denoted by p = (p0,p1,1,p1,2), with the second superscript,
referring to the coordination-outcome.
Let us now turn to equilibrium expectations. There are two principle types of limiting
distributions of the stochastic process of individual expectations. These types can be
interpreted in terms of a coordination state of agents’ expectations they imply. First, the
process converges to one of its extremal invariant measures, say δe1. Then there is no
uncertainty as to the coordination-outcome, and agents correctly assign the probability
π1 = 1 to the occurrence of ηe1 and the probability π2 = 0 to the occurrence of ηe2. As
a result, sunspot-equilibria cannot be induced by the process itself. Second, the limiting
distribution of the process is a convex combination δα = αδe1 + (1 − α)δe2 of its extremal
invariant measures. When a realization is drawn from the measure δα, it is either the full-
consensus conﬁguration ηe1 (with probability α), or the full-consensus conﬁguration ηe2
(with probability 1 − α). Importantly, it follows from the properties of the convergence of
the process to a mixed invariant measure, as described in the ﬁnal part of Section 2, that
each agent can learn - by sampling the realizations of the process in any large ﬁnite volume
- the correct probabilities of the full-consensus outcomes. Thus, each agent will correctly
expect an occurrence of ηe1 with probability π1 = α and of ηe2 with probability π2 = 1−α.
With the above motivation, we introduce the following notions.
Deﬁnition 2. We deﬁne a coordination-state as the limiting distribution of the stochastic
process on X. We deﬁne a coordination-outcome as any realization from the limiting
distribution of the stochastic process - i.e. any realization from the coordination-state.
Since in each mixed coordination-state of the process, the possible coordination-outcomes
are ηe1 and ηe2, in which agents are in agreement about the associated equilibrium, these
outcomes can play the role of the sunspot-events.
Remark 2. With a more general speciﬁcation of the coordination process (see comments
in Sect. 4), one would be interested only in the empirical distribution of the coordination-
state, which is a, in general random, measure on S.
To complete the model, let us now return to the speciﬁcation of the underlying economy.
The present paper will relate to the Cass (1989) example, only with extra emphasis on
a countable set of agents. Each agent a ∈ A is characterized by a diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ua : R2
+ → ¯ R with




++. Neither the utility func-
tion nor the endowment vector depend on the realization of the expectation coordinationLOCAL INTERACTIONS AS A DECENTRALIZED MECHANISM ... 9


































sba s = 1,2. (7)
To deﬁne aggregate variables for a countably inﬁnite set of agents, the distribution-
economy approach due to Hildenbrand (1970, 1974) is taken. Let fy(·,φ,w) : R3
++ →
R3
++ denote an individual good-demand function of an agent with preference φ ∈ P and
endowment w ∈ T derived from the above maximization problem. Let fb(·,φ,w) : R3
++ → R












In order to directly refer to Cass’ (1989) results, we assume that ν is concentrated on a
common preference φc and on just two diﬀerent endowment vectors w1 and w2 (with equal
weights for (φc,w1) and (φc,w2)) so that mean good-demand obtains as










while mean asset-demand obtains as










The conditions for equilibrium read, for the good-markets
(10) fy(p
∗,φc,w1) + fy(p
∗,φc,w2) = w1 + w2




Intuitively, the economy is a countably inﬁnite product of identical two-agent economies
from the Cass’ (1989) example, such that equilibrium conditions reduce to those in the
single two-agent economy.10 M. HOHNISCH
The results derived by Cass (1989) can thus imply the existence of endogenous sunspot-
equilibria, in the sense deﬁned above, for any mixed coordination-state of the expectations
process.
Finally, a remark needs to be made about the individual state space S. Since the set of
equilibria emerges only upon convergence of the process, it seems unreasonable to assume
that agents know the ﬁnal equilibrium-(price)-expectations e1 and e2 before convergence of
the coordination process has occurred (in fact, the two-state coordination model would col-
lapse in the case when there is convergence to an extremal invariant measure, and if agents
anticipated this). For the present model it suﬃces to assume that some disequilibrium-
expectations e1(t) and e2(t) of the equilibrium-price (with disequilibrium referring to the
distribution of the process at time t) are obtained by the agents in some sampling process,
without specifying explicitly the time-path of their values. The stringent assumption to be
made is that agents agree on common expectations at each point of time (because of the
speciﬁc formulation of transition rates in Eq.(1)). Given the latter assumption, the speciﬁc
time-path of the common equilibrium expectations e1(t) and e2(t) has no consequences and
only the ﬁnal - correct - equilibrium expectations matter.
3.2. Coordination between multiple equilibria and trivial sunspots. Let us again
consider an economy with a countably inﬁnite set of agents. Assume that the spot market
of the economy in t = 1 allows for multiple, say two, equilibria (while no actions relevant
for period 1 can be taken in period t = 0). Let the expectation set S, being the individual
state-space of the stochastic coordination model, comprise the expectation that either one
of the spot-equilibria will occur. Say the process is started at some conﬁguration η0 or
at some initial distribution µ0 for which convergence to an invariant measure δ ∈ I is
known to occur. In a similar argument as was presented in Section 3.1, two cases can be
distinguished. If the limiting measure is extremal, then there is no macroscopic uncertainty,
and the equilibrium which is expected to occur indeed occurs. If the limiting measure is
non-extremal, with probability weights α and 1 − α assigned to the full-consensus states
δe1 and δe2, the expectations associated with the full-consensus conﬁgurations ηe1 and ηe2
are π1 = α and π2 = 1 − α respectively. This case corresponds to what Mas-Colell (1992)
calls a trivial sunspot-equilibrium.
4. Discussion
It was claimed that in the economic model presented in this paper a “sunspot-event”
arises endogenously - as the realization of a certain stochastic process representing the
coordination process of equilibrium expectations. This claim deserves further elaboration,
since it can be argued that, after all, the coordination process of individual expectations isLOCAL INTERACTIONS AS A DECENTRALIZED MECHANISM ... 11
decoupled from the agents’ decisions, and thus as much exogenous to the economy as the
vaguely speciﬁed sunspot-event in the traditional sense.
The reply to this critique is that in the above model, possibly extended to a multi-period
setting, a linkage could be established between the coordination process of expectations and
the macroscopic variables of the economy. Conceptually, such feedback from macroscopic
to microscopic variables was recently elaborated by Hahn (2003). Technically, it can be
introduced in the present model by making the a-priori distribution of individual expecta-
tions, which is the Bernoulli distribution in the above analysis, related to the realization of
one or more macroscopic variables, or trends, patterns etc. in their time-path. In this way,
a bi-directional linkage between the expectations process and other economic variables can
be established.
Another issue deserving comment is the speciﬁc role of the two-dimensional Voter Model
as the underlying stochastic process. Indeed, the property of having precisely the two
full-consensus point-mass conﬁgurations in the support of the invariant measures is spe-
ciﬁc to the Voter Model for lattice-dimension less or equal two. For lattice-dimension
three or more, there appear additional extremal invariant measures not concentrated on
full-consensus conﬁgurations. The same is true if the transition probabilities are slightly
changed. For instance, if the transition rate for an agent is slightly positive despite all his
neighbors being in agreement with him, the resulting invariant measures (there are multiple
such measures for lattice-dimension two or more) no longer have an empirical distribution
concentrated on full-consensus outcomes. Then, though there is no macroscopic uncertainty
for translation-invariant extremal measures, a ﬁxed percentage of agents deviates from the
majority expectation. There are economic implications of such residual heterogeneity, but
they call for a separate treatment and discussion (see Hohnisch (2005)).
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Appendix
It is known from the general theory of Markov processes (see e.g. Gihman and Skorohod
(1975)) that a Markov process is uniquely determined by a Markov semigroup.
Deﬁnition 3. A Markov semigroup of operators on C(X) is a family (St)t∈R+ of linear
operators on C(X) satisfying the following conditions
(1) S0 = I (identity operator)
(2) The mapping t → S(t)f from [0,∞) to C(X) is rightcontinuous for every f ∈ C(X)
(3) S(t1 + t2) = S(t1)S(t2)
(4) S(t)1 = 1∀t ≥ 0
(5) S(t)f ≥ 0 whenever f ∈ C(X) and f ≥ 0.
In turn, by the Hille-Yosida Theorem there is a one-to-one correspondence between
Markov semigroups on C(X) and Markov generators on C(X). The generator G of a







deﬁned on an appropriate set of functions, with ηa denoting a conﬁguration in X obtaining
from η by changing the a-th coordinate. The process thus determined has by construction
the required local dynamics.